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SETTING THE PRICE IN A CLOSE CORPORATION 
BUY-SELL AGREEMENT 
David Keith Page* 
T HE stockholders of a close corporation may consider it im-portant to keep control of the business "within the family." 
This can be accomplished through a restrictive agreement, typi-
cally one which gives the corporation or the remaining stock-
holders a first option to purchase the shares of any departing 
stockholder.1 The original owners may also wish to guarantee 
themselves a ready purchaser for their stock when they die or 
leave the business. This second objective can be attained by 
adopting a restrictive agreement which places an obligation on 
the departing stockholder to sell to the corporation or to the 
surviving stockholders, who in tum are obligated to buy from him. 
Such a mandatory scheme is commonly known as a buy-sell 
agreement. 
Perhaps the most challenging and certainly the most signifi-
cant decision confronting the draftsman of a buy-sell agreement 
is the selection of the price or price-fixing technique. From a 
legal standpoint, the agreement may be void or unenforceable on 
the ground of vagueness if the price-fixing provision is omitted.2 
From a practical standpoint the provision is the heart of the 
contract. It is the device which determines, often at some remote 
future date, the financial position of the parties vis-a-vis the 
corporation. Thoughtfully conceived and drafted it can be the 
mechanism for a mutually satisfactory division of closely held 
business interests. But when selected without adequate reflection 
as to its appropriateness in a given situation, it can be the source 
of confusion, disputes, and often litigation.3 
The price-fixing provision must be, in every sense of the 
word, tailor-made. Because each corporate situation is unique, 
• LL.B., Harvard, 1958.-Ed. 
1 For an excellent discussion of all aspects of restrictive agreements, see O'Neal, 
"Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 
65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 773 (1952). 
2See Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597 0.t 603, 124 A. 118 (1924) (dictum). 
3 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REV. 325 at 346 (1952). 
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no one technique can be said to be superior to all others in every 
instance.4 Nor for that matter can any particular technique be 
condemned as universally unsatisfactory, although one is hard 
pressed to find justification for the use of certain methods, such 
as allowing the board of directors to set the price. However, there 
are certain considerations which are so fundamental to the intelli-
gent selection of a price-fixing technique that a brief discussion 
of them here might be useful before proceeding to a more detailed 
examination of the techniques themselves. 
FACTORS To BE CoNSIDERED IN SELECTING A PrucE-FIXING 
TECHNIQUE 
When the stockholders of a small corporation agree to buy 
each other out after certain events, such as the death or retirement 
of one of them, is it necessary that the acquisition price be "fair"? 
Implicit in this question is the assumption that one can define 
and pinpoint a "fair" price. Presumably it is the price that would 
be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller in an arm's-length 
transaction immediately following the event. Yet the very nature 
of the typical close corporation makes this definition illusory. 
Seldom does closely held stock have an ascertainable market value.5 
There may be no buyers at all for an interest in a personal, family, 
or highly specialized business. Indeed it is the very prospect of 
unsaleability which normally gives rise to the buy-sell agreement 
itself. Nevertheless, there are methods which can be used to 
approximate the theoretical "market value" of a small business 
with some degree of objectivity and reliability. Therefore, the 
real question the draftsman must ask himself is "How essential 
is it that I select the one price-fixing technique which will reflect 
most closely 'market value' "? 
There is something to be said for a less-than-fair-value purchase 
of a departing stockholder's interest, sometimes called a "cheap 
takeover." While actively engaged in th~ business, a stockholder 
contributes to its growth and normally withdraws much of his 
interest in the form of salary. Once the active relationship is 
4 See ROHRLICH, ORGANIZlNG CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 
106 (1953). 
5 See Kragen, "Some Thoughts on the Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests," 
43 CALIF. L. REv. 781 (1955). 
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terminated by death or retirement, it may not be unreasonable 
to consider his interest as nominal and to value it accordingly, 
thereby freeing the business from draining obligations to past 
members.6 This view may be especially attractive where the cor-
poration is a family business; for even a "fair" payment would 
merely redistribute wealth within the family unit. However, as 
will be pointed out later, serious tax disadvantages may result 
from undervaluation in such circumstances. Then, too, if at the 
date of contracting the parties seem to have an equal chance of 
survival, there is the psychological factor that each party expects, 
or at least hopes, that he will be the last to go. Coupled with a 
natural inclination to gamble, this factor could and probably 
does have a mutually depressing effect on the price fixed.7 
Despite the above considerations, it seems preferable in most 
cases to fix the price as close as possible to the anticipated "fair" 
value. Not only might this be crucial in determining the valuation 
for estate and inheritance tax purposes, but it also substantially 
reduces the likelihood of friction or even litigation between the 
parties. 8 Although prevailing law does not seem to regard mere 
inadequacy of price as sufficient to render restrictive agreements 
invalid,9 there are some decisions to the contrary.10 By giving each 
party a "fair" price, the agreement is simply compensating each 
stockholder for his labor and foresight. The parties are not, there-
fore, forced during their lifetimes to squeeze the corporation of 
large sums in the form of salaries or dividends. 
Of course it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice complete fairness 
in order to satisfy other objectives ~uch as ease of application and 
economy of operation. Any resulting disparity in price can be 
justified by the fact that each party stands to gain as much as he 
might lose from the dispari~, at least where each party has an 
6 Ness, "Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options To Purchase 
Stock on Death," 49 COL. L. REV. 796 at 816 (1949). 
7Id. at 815. 
SLAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 22 (1948). 
9 See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y. (2d) 534, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957), 
where the court granted specific performance to an agreement which required the 
retiring shareholders to take a price equal only to what they had originally paid, 
although the actual value was considerably higher. 
10 See, e.g., Greene v. E.H. Rollins &: Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938), 
where a provision allowing the corporation to repurchase stock at a price equal to 
asset value per share, exclusive of good-will or going-concern value, was declared invalid 
as unfair and against public policy. 
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equal chance of being a buyer rather than a seller under the 
agreement.11 
In addition to being "fair," the price-fixing mechanism must 
be framed in such a way as to eliminate or minimize future con-
troversies. Vague or ambiguous terminology is the most frequent 
cause of litigation over buy-sell agreements.12 Some techniques, 
such as using par value or a flat dollar amount as the transfer 
price, are by nature free from interpretative difficulties. Others, 
for example basing the price on "book value," can be deceptively 
simple. Still others, particularly those involving formulae, contain 
terms which must be precisely defined if the technique is to 
operate at all. 
The buy-sell agreement will offer little protection to some 
stockholders if the agreement price, though fair when set, can be 
manipulated by those in control of the corporation. This is the ob-
vious objection to the technique which places the price determina-
tion in the hands of the company's board of directors.13 More subtle 
forms of manipulation can be achieved under other price-fixing 
techniques. For example, where "book value" is to be the guide 
to valuation, the directors' control of such decisions as the amount 
to be included in reserves and whether to value assets at cost or 
current worth may significantly affect the price. Although the 
directors are probably required by law to act in good faith in 
these matters, 14 the scope of their permissible conduct remains 
extremely broad. It is occasionally suggested that a provision be 
included in the restrictive agreement permitting a stockholder 
unilaterally to withdraw after a number of years.15 Although 
there may be instances in which such a provision would prove 
useful, 16 it can also lead to a form of manipulation. When the 
specified period is about to expire, the stockholder whose prospects 
11 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 797 (1952). 
12 The following terms, among others, have created difficulty -because of their un-
certain meaning: earnings, Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122 A. 675 (1923); net cost 
price, Cohen v. Elias, 176 App. Div. 763, 163 N.Y.S. 1051 (1917); net returns, Jeffrey v. 
Genter, (Pa. Com. Pl. 1944) 45 Lack. Jur. IOI. 
13 See Krebs v. McDonald's Exr., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87 at 89-90. 
14 See First Nat. Bank of Montclair v. Coldwell, 286 App. Div. 1079, 145 N.Y.S. (2d) 
674 (1956). 
15 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the 
Transferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 776 (1955). 
16 See Overbeck and Teevan, "W-hat Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and 
Sell Agreements," 43 ILL. B. J. 264 at 277-278 (1955). 
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for survival look the best can force his co-stockholder to renego-
tiate a lower valuation for their interests by threatening to with-
draw from the agreement altogether, leaving the co-stockholder 
with unmarketable stock. There may be other occasions, however, 
when a provision for complete termination of the agreement 
would be desirable, as in the event of corporate bankruptcy, 
receivership, or dissolution or upon the death of a specified 
number of stockholders.17 
Cost to the client must, of course, be considered in drafting 
the restrictive agreement. Certain techniques, like "book value" 
and capitalization of earnings, have pivotal terms which require 
precise definition. Consequently they will take more of the 
draftsman's time. Techniques involving appraisal or arbitration 
may be easier to draft, but the actual use of these methods at the 
operative date can be quite expensive.18 
In formulating the price-fixing mechanism, the lawyer should 
not overlook the effect on the value of the corporation of the event 
which makes the agreement operative. Since most stockholders 
in close corporations are active in the daily conduct of the business, 
the death or retirement of any given stockholder might severely 
impair the corporation's earning capacity. This is particularly true 
in service businesses, where good will rests on the personalities of a 
few key men, and it is also true where a stockholder has peculiar 
talents or information vital to the business. To set the agreement 
price, by capitalizing earnings for example, without adjusting for 
the operative event would unjustly burden the survivors and 
give a windfall to the departing stockholder. Some attorneys 
provide for the impact of the operative event by specifically ex-
cluding any figure for good will from the computation of the 
purchase price, usually based on "book value."19 This may jeopar-
dize an otherwise low federal estate tax valuation, and it would 
be better to assign a nominal value to good will when using "book 
value," and in other techniques to spell out that good will was 
considered in making the ultimate formulation. 
If one of the parties has a minority interest in the corporation, 
17 Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Trans-
ferability of Stock," 43 Iu.. B. J. 766 at 776 (1955). 
18 See RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ·ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 
112 (1953). 
19 Cf. Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements,'' 95 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 
408 (1956). 
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not only must he protect himself against possible abuse of the 
price-fixing mechanism by those in control but he must also not 
permit his weaker bargaining position to force him to accept an 
undesirable technique.20 A more advantageous approach would 
be to press for a "fair" method of valuation and then agree to have 
a certain sum deducted from his share or added to the majority 
holder's share to allow for the inherent differences in value be-
tween controlling and minority interests. A similar provision can 
be utilized in multi-party buy-sell agreements where one stock-
holder owns "key" stock.21 
Whether the parties to the buy-sell agreement are only the 
stock.holders inter se or include the corporate entity, it is quite 
common to provide the cash necessary to purchase departing inter-
ests by taking out insurance on the life of each stock.holder. The 
introduction of this insurance feature raises many ticklish prob-
lems,22 especially in the area of federal income taxes. This article 
will not attempt to deal with those problems except insofar as 
the use of insurance has direct repercussions on fixing a price. 
Obviously, the closer one is able to predict the ultimate purchase 
price the better he will be able to choose the proper amount of 
insurance needed for the funding. On the other hand, there are 
some cases in which the purchase price will turn in part on the 
amount of insurance procured. If the corporate entity is a party 
to the buy-sell agreement, the amount of insurance proceeds re-
ceived by the corporation on the death of a stock.holder becomes 
an asset of the corporation and ought to be included in the 
computation of the deceased's interest.23 Some agreements go so 
far as to fix the purchase price at "book value" or the amount of 
the insurance proceeds, whichever is higher.24 Naturally this can 
give a substantial windfall to the departing stock.holder if his 
interest has been over-insured. 
20 See Ness, "Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options To 
Purchase Stock on Death," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 796 at 816 (1949). 
21 Cf. Bushman, "Valuation of Close Corporation Securities," 90 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
228 at 233 (1951). 
22 See note, 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 687 (1958). 
23 For a fuller discussion of the impact of insurance on fixing a price and the pos-
sible inequities that can result when the insurance proceeds are omitted from the com-
putation, see Davis, "Recent Developments in Business Purchase Agreements," 94 TRUSTS 
AND ESTATES 284 (1955). 
24 See Overbeck and Teevan, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and 
Sell Agreements," 43 ILL. B. J. 264 at 269 (1955). 
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The selection of the appropriate documents in which to place 
the agreement itself has some bearing on the price-fixing pro-
vision. Broadly speaking, buy-sell provisions are valid whether 
placed in the articles of incorporation or in a separate stockholders' 
agreement.25 There is some controversy concerning the validity 
of placing the buy-sell provisions in the corporate by-laws in the 
absence of express authorization by the articles to do so.26 The 
practice has generally been, according to one leading authority, 
to place the buy-sell provisions in separate stockholders' agree-
ments rather than in either the articles or the by-laws.27 There 
may be good reason for omitting the buy-sell provisions from 
the articles, at least in jurisdictions where the appropriate state 
agency carefully examines all charter provisions and rejects those 
it considers improper.28 In Illinois, for example, the "Corporation 
Department of the Office of Secretary of State refuses to accept for 
filing articles which contain a restrictive provision fixing an unfair 
price, such as one requiring a shareholder to sell his $100 par 
value shares for a flat price of $50."29 Nevertheless, it would seem 
preferable whenever possible to put the provisions in both the 
articles and a separate agreement.30 
Regardless whether the provisions are placed in the articles, 
by-laws, or separate agreement, they should definitely be included 
on every stock certificate.31 The Uniform Stock Transfer Act 
provides " ... and there shall be no restriction upon the transfer of 
shares so represented by virtue of any by-laws of the corpora-
tion, or otherwise, unless the right of the corporation to such . . . 
restriction is stated upon the certificate."32 This statute has some-
times been construed to mean that a mere reference in the stock 
certificate to the by-laws or other source of the restriction is 
25 ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 
102-103 (1953). 
26 See Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L. 
REV. 229 at 237 (1951). 
27 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan-
ning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 782 (1952). 
28 Id. at 783. 
29 Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Trans-
ferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955). 
30 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan-
ning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. :REv. 773 at 786-788 (1952). 
31 Cataldo, "Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation," 37 VA. L. 
REv. 229 at 231 (1951). 
32 Uniform. Stock Transfer Act §15, 6 UL.A. 20. 
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insufficient to impose the restriction upon a transferee of the 
stock, even one who had actual notice of the restrictive provisions.38 
Presumably, if the restrictive provisions were too long to be in-
cluded in full upon the stock certificate, the statute would be 
satisfied by a statement on the certificate of the duty of the holder 
to sell to the corporation or to the other stockholders, mention 
of the price or price-fixing method, and a reference to the articles, 
by-laws, or separate agreement where the complete terms might 
be.found. 
Naturally the legality of any price-fixing technique must be 
checked under local law. This is especially true of provisions which . 
set the price by arbitration, for executory agreements to arbitrate 
are unenforceable in many jurisdictions.34 • 
The most obvious, and often thought to be the most impor-
tant, consideration is the tax consequences of the buy-sell agree-
ment, particularly the binding effect of the price fixed in the 
agreement on the estate and inheritance tax valuation of a deceased 
stockholder's shares. Discussion of this subject will be postponed 
until after we have considered more closely the individual price-
setting techniques. 
TH'.E TECHNIQUES OF PRICE-FIXING 
Although the variety of price-fixing methods is limited only 
by the imagination of the draftsman, authorities have noted certain 
methods which are employed with some regularity.35 Those which 
88 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Topsham Tel. Co., (Vt. 1957) 132 A. (2d) 170; but see Allen 
v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y. (2d) 534, 141 N.E. (2d) 812 (1957). 
34 At common law, a general agreement to submit to arbitration any and all disputes 
arising under a contract is voidable at will by either party ·before a valid award is made. 
Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 445 (1874). However, the agreement is en-
forceable if an award is made, and damages may be recovered for its breach. Red Cross 
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941). Statutes and an 
increasing judicial willingness to accept arbitration as a quick and inexpensive way to 
settle disputes have tended to restrict the rule. Johnson v. Noble, 13 N.H. 286 (1842); 
Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. (58 U.S.) 344 (1854); Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 
~57 N.C. 194, 72 S.E. 998 (1911); Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service 
Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935); Mdntosh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mont. 434, 78 P. (2d) 
82 (1938). 
35 The common methods of valuation include: flat price, book value, market price, 
appraisal, arbitration capitalization of earnings, authorization of director or shareholders 
to establish price, years purchase formula, .best offer, tax valuation, or some combination 
of -these. See FINNEY AND MIµ.ER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING: INTRODUGrORY, 4th ed., 272 
(1953); O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning 
and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REV. 773 at 801-804 (1952); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 
162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894). 
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seem to be the most suitable for the ordinary close corporation 
are discussed in the sections which follow. The others, in the 
opinion of this ·writer, do not merit extensive treatment here 
because they contain certain objectionable features which make 
them unacceptable for general use. For example, an attempt to 
set the price by use of the "market value" of the stock, while 
desirable in theory, is usually impossible in close corporations, 
which typically have no ready market for their stock.88 Using 
the average value of listed stocks in the same industry as a guide 
to "market value" can be extremely dangerous because it precludes 
consideration of the unique features of the corporation in questio?J. 
and neglects the influence of the operative contingency on true 
value.87 Similarly, a price based on the "best offer" received by 
the stockholder for his shares within a given period is completely 
unsatisfactory where the stock, under the buy-sell agreement, is 
subject to mandatory sale to the corporation or other stock-
holders.88 As a practical matter, no offers for that stock will be 
made. A price-fixing method which accepts the valuation made 
for estate or inheritance tax purposes is not desirable because 
of the delay involved and the loss of possible tax benefits the 
restriction might otherwise create.89 Also undesirable are methods 
which use as the purchase price estimated future earnings of the 
corporation within a given period or installment payments of 
a percentage of actual future earnings within that period. These 
methods involve not only the risk and unpredictability of future 
profits but, at least in the latter case, the probability that the 
Commissioner will make an independent determination of value 
which will be higher than the price actually received by the estate. 
The obvious disadvantage of a method which allows the surviving 
shareholders or directors to set the price is that it gives "a carte 
blanche grant of power to ... set the valuation at whatever they 
[consider] reasonable so long as they [act] in good faith."40 One 
36 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 801 (1952). 
37 But see Johnson, Shapiro and O'Meara, "Valuation of Closely-Held Stock for 
Federal Tax Purposes: Approach to an Objective Method," 100 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 166 
(1951), where it is suggested that the value of comparable listed stocks be used to fix 
a floor-ceiling range on the valuation. 
as See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 802 (1952). 
39 Id. at 805. 
40 Krebs v. McDonald's Exr., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87 at 90. 
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major difficulty with the so-called Solomon's choice method in 
which the survivor makes up two equal lists of assets from which 
the executor takes his choice41 is that it forces a termination of 
the business if the executor chooses the list with most of the 
working assets. 
Book Value 
The method which appears to be the "most frequently used 
starting point" for fixing the price in a buy-sell agreement is book 
value.42 No doubt the reason for this extensive use of book value 
is its apparent simplicity of operation coupled with reasonably 
accurate approximation of "fair" value. However, as many lawyers 
have discovered to their dismay, both the simplicity and accuracy 
of book value are likely to be illusory.43 
What exactly is meant by the term "book value" when used as 
a measure of price in a buy-sell agreement? This question has been 
the subject of much litigation and the answers have not been 
uniform.44 The controversy involves whether to have a "strict, lit-
eral utilization of book accounts (as reflected in a balance sheet) 
or whether modifications, other than for blatant errors, may be 
made to 'correct' or more fairly set forth the book values."45 Al-
though the courts tend to lean toward the strict, literal interpreta-
tion, 46 especially when the provision is tied to the accounting prac-
tices commonly used by the corporation,47 there is no guarantee 
that they will do so in any particular case. In the recent case of 
Aron v. Gillman,48 for example, a New York court was construing 
a restrictive agreement under which the price was to be set by 
"book value" as "determined by the most recent audit" of the com-
pany. The court held that the value of the inventory should have 
been based on a physical count rather than on the estimated basis 
41 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 at 325 (1952). 
42 Id. at 327. 
43 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 799 (1952). 
44See comment, 31 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 608 at 611 (1956). Compare Stans and Goedert, 
"What Is Book Value?" 99 J. AccoUNTANCY 38 Gan. 1955) with May and Dohr, "Book 
Value: A Brief Comment on the Stans-Goedert Article," id. at 42 (April 1955). 
45 Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements," 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 408 
(1956). 
46Ibid. 
47 See, e.g., Soechtig v. Amick, 285 App. Div. 701, 140 N.Y.S. (2d) 85 (1955). 
48 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E. (2d) 284 (1955). 
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actually used in the "most recent audit." Moreover, an item for 
accrued income taxes, which had not been reflected on the 
company's balance sheet, was required to be considered in the 
determination of "book value." This case, and others like it, dem-
onstrates that the attorney who drafts a buy-sell agreement calling 
for the purchase of the stock at "book value" without further defi-
nition may be subjecting his client to costly litigation.49 It is ab-
solutely essential that the agreement spell out exactly what is 
meant by "book value," who is to make the determination of dis-
puted items, and the conclusiveness of that determination. The in-
clusion of some vague phrase limiting "book value" in accordance 
with "generally accepted accounting practices" or "recognized ac-
counting principles" is of less than no help since it invites a dis-
pute as to what practices and principles are so accepted and recog-
nized. One way of minimizing the possibility of future disputes 
over the meaning of "book value" is to provide that the net worth 
(assets minus liabilities) which appears on the balance sheet for the 
last fiscal period shall be conclusively deemed to equal the aggre-
gate book value of all stock in the corporation.rm The difficulty 
with this method is that, though reducing definitional problems, it 
may result in a figure which is not fair to either the buyer or the 
seller in terms of the actual underlying values of the corporation's 
assets. Moreover, it is especially disadvantageous to a minority 
stockholder since it carries the seeds of potential manipulation of 
balance sheet figures by the directors who, as long as they act in 
good faith, are under no obligation to reflect the actual value of 
the assets on the corporation's books.51 Thus the minority may find 
themselves at the mercy of the majority as was true in Druchlieb 
v. Harris52 where the court sustained a write-down of good will 
and other assets by the directors in the face of a restrictive agree-
ment calling for a purchase price based on "book value." 
49 Compare Hollister v. Fredler, 22 N.J. Super. 439, 92 A. (2d) 52 (1952), with Fleming 
v. Fleming, 2ll Iowa 1251, 230 N.W. 359 (1931), and Elhard v. Rott, 36 N.D. 2ll, 162 
N.W. 302 (1917). See comment, 24 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 592 (1955). 
50 See Rubel v. Rubel, 721 Miss. 848, 75 S. (2d) 59 (1954); Lane v. Barnard, 185 
App. Div. 754, 173 N.Y.S. 714 (1919); Gurley v. Woodbury, 177 N.C. 70, 97 S.E. 754 (1919). 
But cf. Wineinger v. Kay, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) 58 S.W. (2d) 876; Mills v. Rich, 249 
Mich. 489, 229 N.W. 462 (1930). See comment, 53 MrGH. L. REv. 972 at 987 (1955). Cf. 
Overbeck and Teevan, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and Sell Agree-
ments," 43 !LI.. B.J. 264 at 269-270 (1955). 
lilSee, e.g., Corbett v • .McClintock-Marshall Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 165, 151 A. 218 (1930). 
52 209 N.Y. 211, 102 N.E. 599 (1913). 
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Manipulation can be avoided if it is provided that "book 
value" is to be determined not by the corporation's books alone 
but by an outside accountant who may use the books as a reference 
but who is not necessarily bound by them and whose decision shall 
be conclusive and binding on the parties.53 Here again there is a 
temptation to insert some standard, such as "limited only by rec-
ognized accounting principles," to guide the accountant, but it is 
the opinion of this writer that the temptation should be resisted. 
Such a standard will add little if anything to the actual criteria 
which the accountant will use in reaching his decision, but it opens 
the door to assertions by disappointed parties that the accountant 
has acted beyond his discretion. On balance, it would seem prefer-
able to choose the disinterested accountant with great care and 
then rely upon his integrity and ability to insure a fair and impar-
tial decision. This method will be more expensive than mere reli-
ance on the corporate books, but the reduction of the chances of 
disputes and litigation should justify the additional expense in 
most instances. It will be noted, of course, that this method em-
bodies an approach similar to that found in the appraisal and ar-
bitration methods. However, it is tied to the general concept of 
"book value" which may be attractive to the parties, and yet it 
minimizes some of the risks inherent in that concept. 
A more fundamental objection directed toward the use of 
"book value," regardless of who applies that concept, is that it is 
an unreliable guide to the measurement of actual values.54 It is 
commonly a record of historical costs and rarely reflects the cur-
rent values of the corporation's assets. The amounts which appear 
in the depreciation reserves represent an amortization of original 
cost rather than an accurate picture of the wear and tear on the 
assets. Intangibles, like good will, are seldom shown on the balance 
sheet or are carried at nominal figures, although they often com-
prise a large part of the real value of a small business. Inventory is 
usually carried at "lower of cost or market" which, when used 
in the computation of "book value," gives an obvious advan-
tage to the purchaser under the buy-sell agreement.55 In short, 
a book value approach normally gives an asset-by-asset compil-
53 See LAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 24 (1948). 
54 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 799 (1952). 
55 See RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 
109 (1953). 
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ation of cost (even neglecting some assets) rather than a gomg-
concern valuation. 
This may not be undesirable in all cases. Good will may disap-
pear with the disappearance of a key stockholder. Book values 
may otherwise approximate actual values. All the parties may be 
willing to gamble on whatever discrepancies remain. "There is 
some suspicion that book value is occasionally prescribed as the 
valuation basis, though substantial intangible values exist, be-
cause of the fear of the complexity and cost of evaluating intan-
gibles, and the probability of litigation."56 
The crucial point to be recognized here is that whether the 
parties want an accurate reflection of true values or whether they 
are willing to allow considerable leeway, they must spell out their 
intentions precisely. The mere use of the term "book value" will 
not assure either result.57 If the agreement refers to "book value," 
it should specify whether this means as shown on the books used 
for corporate or for tax purposes. 58 All elements which might cre-
ate disputes should be carefully delineated as to their inclusion or 
exclusion from "book value," and the exact bases of inclusion 
should be described. A partial list of items that should be dealt 
with includes recognition of appreciation or diminution in the 
value of assets, method of depreciation, method of inventory valu-
ation, treatment of reserves for contingencies, recognition of good 
will and other intangibles, method of computing bad debt reserves, 
and capitalization of repairs and improvements. "In any event, 
unless the agreement calls for the separate valuation of goodwill, 
it should expressly provide that the amount to be paid for the 
decedent's interests includes payment for goodwill. Disputes and 
litigation between the parties and with the tax authorities may 
result if this is overlooked."59 The lawyer should work with the 
company's accountant and receive his approval of the various 
56 Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements," 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 408 
at 408 (1956). 
57 Compare Aron v. Gillman, 309 N.Y. 157, 128 N.E. (2d) 284 (1955), with Druchlieb 
v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 211, 102 N.E. 599 (1913). 
58 Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 328 (1952). 
59 LAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 24-25 (1948); Forster, "Valuing a Business 
Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agreement," 4 STAN. L. ·R.Ev. 325 at 
330 (1952); Estate of George Marshall Trammell, 18 T.C. 662 (1952), acq., 1953-1 CUM. 
BUL. 6; Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 CUM. BUL. 255; Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code §20.2031-3, 
21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956). 
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definitions embodied in the agreement. Then the parties should 
be jointly consulted and the consequences of the definitions should 
be fully explained.60 There are, of course, limitations in terms of 
the time and money that can be expended on the drafting of such 
provisions, but, within reasonable bounds and after consultation 
with the accountants, the attorney should be able to draft a fairly 
comprehensive provision which will eliminate major future 
disputes. 
Providing elaborate definitions of the components of "book 
value" is not as essential where the determination is left to a dis-
interested third party. If the third party was trusted sufficiently 
to be made the arbiter of the "book value" issue, he can probably 
be depended upon to take into account the intent of the parties, 
though not being hamstrung by a legal obligation to do so. 
Care should also be taken to provide for the precise date on 
which the "book value" is to be determined. It might be the end 
of a specified accounting period, the date notice of the desire to 
sell is given, the date of death, or the date the survivors give no-
tice of. their intent to purchase. "Ordinarily, in order to avoid 
closing books, making an audit and taking an inventory, it is pref-
erable to provide that book value will be calculated as of the 
end of the last preceding fiscal or calendar year or some other desig-
nated accounting period."61 Provisions may also be made for ap-
propriate adjustments for the period between the above date and 
the date of death or payment. 62 Perhaps some requirement for 
periodic review of the book value clause by the parties might also 
be included.63 
A buy-sell agreement which uses "book value" as its price-
fixing mechanism is widely regarded as a valid agreement, neither 
confiscatory, a restraint on alienation, nor against public policy.64 
The desirability of using this method is open to greater doubt.615 
60 Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for Purposes of a Purchase and Sale Agree-
ment;" 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 328 (1952). 
61 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan-
ning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 773 at 800 (1952). 
62 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 329 (1952). 
63 Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements," 95 TRUSIS AND EsrATES 408 
(1956). 
64 See, e.g., Coleman v. Kettering, (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) 289 S.W. (2d) 953; but see 
Security Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, (Ala. 1949) 38 S. (2d) 274. 
65 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Trans-
ferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 774 (1955). 
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It is not as flexible as a formula or renegotiated fixed-price method, 
but it might be made so with periodic review. Its accuracy as a 
measure of value will generally depend on the nature of the busi-
ness, the accounting practices of the corporation, and the modifi-
cations made in those practices under the agreement. Unless terms 
are meticulously defined or a third party's definition is made con-
clusively binding, use of "book value" is apt to provoke contro-
versy at the operative date. 
Capitalization of Earnings and Other Formulae 
The technique of capitalizing earnings has been used with 
some success in other contexts to arrive at the going-concern value 
of any given enterprise.66 Stated simply, it involves the multiplica-
tion of the average annual net earnings of the business by some 
fixed figure known as the rate of capitalization. Other formula 
methods, including the two-step technique of A.R.M. 34,67 are 
variations and refinements of the basic capitalization of earnings 
approach. Most authorities agree that a formula method of valua-
tion is not generally satisfactory for use as the price-fixing mecha-
nism in a buy-sell agreement, 68 but there are some dissents from 
this conclusion. 69 Although criticism is usually levelled at the 
"complicated calculations" involved in a formula method,70 this 
is not really an accurate appraisal of the problem. The actual 
computation of a price under a formula is a relatively simple, 
mechanical matter. If the rates of capitalization which are used as 
multipliers are specified in the agreement, the only unknown 
quantity remaining at the time of computation is the "average net 
earnings" or similar base figure. Once this latter figure is deter-
mined (a task which need not be difficult), the steps remaining to 
66 See RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 109 (1953). 
67 2 CuM. BUL. 31 (1920). This involves a determination of the earning power of the 
tangible and intangible assets of a business through a capitalization of these items at 
different rates. See also Gardner, "The SEC and Valuation Under Chapter X," 91 UNIV. 
PA. L. R.Ev. 440 (1943). 
68 See, e.g., Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the 
Transferability of Stock," 43 Iu.. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955); ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CoR-
PORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 109-110 (1953). 
69 See, e.g., Swados, "Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement," 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 189 at 193 (1957). 
10 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the Trans-
ferability of Stock," 43 ILL. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955). 
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arrive at the ultimate price are merely matters of simple 
arithmetic. 
The real difficulty with formula methods when used in ordi-
nary close corporation buy-sell agreements is one of fairness. The 
elements of the formula are not usually reliable guides to a true 
valuation of the business. Perhaps the most unreliable element 
is the rate of capitalization itself. The draftsman is forced to decide 
what exact multiple of earnings would accurately reflect the true 
value of the business. He might be able to use the price-earnings 
ratio of stock in a comparable busine~s which has a readily ascer-
tainable market value.71 But finding a comparable business will be 
hard and there is no assurance that the comparability will persist 
until the time the formula is to be employed. Or he might adopt a 
figure that seems appropriate in view of the nature of the business. 
Although most experts will not hazard a guess as to the "correct" 
rate of capitalization for businesses in general,72 Dewing has classi-
fied businesses into certain categories and assigned rates of capital-
ization to each category.73 He suggests a multiple of four for small 
businesses of a rank and file chai:acter, but even this figure must be 
reduced for new or personal businesses or those seasonal in na-
ture.74 Although his estimates are based upon experience and, to 
some extent, judicial opinions, there is no assurance that they will 
be accurate in any given case. This is especially true where the 
corporation is small and its fortunes subject to wide fluctuations. 
Any figure selected by the draftsman, though based on sound 
judgment and authority, will be no more than an intelligent 
guess. Moreover, the passage of time may cause the guess made on 
the agreement date to be entirely inappropriate to the character of 
the business as it exists at the operative date. 
Then, too, the fair period over which earnings are to be aver-
aged must be designated. If predicted incorrectly, this decision 
could lead to a serious distortion of the value of the business. The 
period ought to be long enough to allow temporary fluctuations 
to be discounted and short enough to reflect adequately the cur-
rent earnings picture of the company. Consideration should be 
given to whether there should be adjustments made for special 
71 See BADGER, VALUATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITIES 119 (1925). 
72See, e.g., 1 BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 259-266 (1937). 
73 1 DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 390-391 (1953). 
74 Id. at 389-390. 
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circumstances, such as war or recessions, during the designated 
period.75 
The other key element in the formula is the "annual net 
earnings." Unless this figure is truly representative of the current 
earnings status of the company and also sufficiently typical to be 
the basis for the prediction of future earnings, the ultimate price 
arrived at under the formula will not be a "fair" approximation 
of going-concern value. Here again the fact that the operative con-
tingency, such as death of a major stockholder, may severely im-
pair the earning potential of the business has to be reckoned with. 
If no adjustment is made for that fact, the value based on current 
earnings will be unrealistically high. 
The annual net earnings which appear on the income state-
ment of the ordinary close corporation do not represent the real 
earning power of the business and to use that figure, without modi-
fication, would result in an inequitable price. For in most close 
corporations a substantial part of the realized income is withdrawn 
in the form of high salaries, which are recorded in the income 
statement as an expense which reduces net earnings. Therefore it 
is essential to provide for some adjustment in the net earnings 
figure as it appears on the books, unless it is felt that some other 
factor, such as the loss of the departing shareholder, counter-
balances the omission of these salaries. However, one writer warns 
that the designation of salaries above a specified amount as prof-
its for capitalization of earnings purposes might be inviting tax 
grief since it puts a red flag on the unreasonableness of these sal-
aries as corporate business expenses. 76 A further distortion of actual 
earnings may exist because of abnormally high interest payments 
being made to stockholders or their families, and attempts to cor-
rect this distortion in the price-fixing formula might have similar 
tax repercussions. Non-recurring items of income and expense, 
unusual business conditions, and foreseeable changes can also 
undermine the representative character of the reported net earn-
ings and should be provided for if the formula is to work fairly.77 
In the formative years of a business operation, earnings, if any, are 
apt to be very small; yet this may not be indicative of the paten-
75 ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 110 
(1953). 
76 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan• 
ning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 773 at 803, n. 111 (1952). 
77 Id. at 802. 
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tial growth of the enterprise, which m!1,y prosper once it has taken 
roots. To capitalize earnings upon the basis of these early figures 
would· not do justice to a departing shareholder whose efforts 
helped create that eventual prosperity. 
The person or method for determining "average annual net 
earnings," or both, should be fully described in the buy-sell agree-
ment.78 Here again the draftsman must decide how many standards 
he wants to spell out and how much he wants to leave to the judg-
ment of the arbiter, whose decision should be binding. 
Use of a capitalization of earnings formula in a buy-sell agree-
ment appears to be needlessly cumbersome in most cases. Where 
the corporation is relatively small or unestablished, earnings 
figures and capitalization rates are poor indicia of true enterprise 
value.79 A provision for periodic review of the formula clause, 
with the old formula to apply if no agreement is reached, might 
help to keep the formula current but seems, on the whole, insuf-
ficient to justify the use of a formula in the ordinary close corpora-
tion. The extensive use of accounting terminology in formula 
techniques tends to stimulate disputes, although much of this can 
be avoided by careful drafting. In larger close corporations, where 
the amounts involved are substantial, where the book net earnings 
are apt to be a fair reflection of the company's position, and where 
capitalization rates have been tested and verified, a formula may be 
the best device for determining value and the extra cost and diffi-
culty of drafting may be justified. 
Appraisal or Arbitration 
Another device, which is often employed in conjunction with 
one of the other methods but which can be used as an independent 
method of price-fixing, is the utilization of third parties-apprais-
ers or arbitrators-to set the price under the agreement when it 
becomes operative. The basic difference between appraisal and 
arbitration is that the former entails the submission of the price 
decision to the third party as an initial matter whereas the latter 
calls upon the third party to decide only if and when the parties 
themselves have failed to agree on a suitable transfer price.80 
78 RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 110 
(1953). 
79 Ibid. 
so See Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440 at 445, 143 N.E. 248 (1924). 
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The term "appraisal" usually suggests a technique by which 
the underlying assets of a business entity are evaluated. To the ex-
tent this connotation is correct, appraisal would not seem well-
suited for price determination under a buy-sell agreement, at least 
where a "fair" price is desired and the business is worth more 
than the sum total of its component assets. It is perfectly possible, 
however, to have the third party or parties, whether they be pro-
fessional appraisers or not, value the business on some basis other 
than mere asset value. If it is desired that "book value" or "capi-
talization of earnings" be used as a guide to the appraisal, such a 
standard can be designated in the agreement. 81 The danger of re-
stricting a third party by some ambiguous standard has already 
been mentioned, and perhaps it might be wiser to specify that the 
appraisal need not be confined to the asset value of the corporation 
but may (not must) take into consideration any other factors 
deemed significant by the appraiser, including book value, net 
earnings, and market prices of similar stocks.82 
There seems to be little doubt that provisions leaving the de-
termination of price in a buy-sell agreement to the appraisal of 
third parties are valid.83 The agreement should include the names 
of the appraisers or the method by which they are to be selected, 
who is to pay them and how, and a provision for substitution of 
new appraisers if the designated ones should be unwilling or un-
able to serve. The usual method of selection is for each party to 
choose one appraiser at the time the specified event takes place 
and have those two appraisers select a third.84 This should in-
clude a provision explaining how the third appraiser , is to be 
chosen in case of deadlock and requiring that the decision of any 
two of the three be binding on the parties. 85 Other methods of se-
lection include designating certain named parties, perhaps the 
81 See O'Neal, '\Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting,'' 65 HARv. L. REV. 773 at 804 (1952). 
82 But see Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and 
Sale Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 at 333 (1952), who insists on giving the appraiser 
specific standards to do the job. 
83 See cases cited in Annotation: Provision of articles, by-laws, or agreement regard-
ing future determination by parties other than owner of price at which corporate stock 
is to be taken over by corporation or stockholders upon specified event, ll7 A.L.R. 1359 
(1938). 
84 See, e.g., provision in Good Fellows Associates v. Silverman, 283 Mass. 173 at 178, 
186 N.E. 48 (1933). 
85 Cf. Currie, "Buy and Sell Agreements With Respect to Corporate and Partnership 
Interests,'' 1950 Wis. L. REv. 12 at 18. 
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company's regular accountant, at the time the agreeme_nt is 
drafted.86 The major drawback of the use of appraisal as the sole 
method for price determination is its expense.87 Where a substan-
tial sum is involved, however, and there are prospects of future 
disagreements if such other methods as book value or capitaliza-
tion of earnings are used, the expense might be worthwhile. 
The use of "arbitration" has the advantage of first allowing 
the parties to try to fix their own price. As a practical matter, the 
chances of the parties agreeing at the operative date seem slim, al-
though this may not be true where there is a sympathetic relation-
ship between the survivors and the departing shareholder or his 
heirs. Also, the threat of arbitration hanging over the heads of the 
parties will tend to curb their more arbitrary tendencies. The con-
siderations involved in guiding arbitrators by standards and the 
methods of selecting arbitrators are basically the same as those 
discussed under appraisal. A more serious problem that may be en-
countered as to arbitration is its legality. In some states an execu-
tory contract to arbitrate is unenforceable.88 There is also some dis-
agreement as to whether the fixing of a price is an arbitrable is-
sue. 89 The possibility that a price fixed by appraisal or arbitration 
will not be binding on the Commissioner for federal estate tax 
purposes will be considered in the subsequent section on tax 
problems. 
Fixed Price 
Another widely adopted method is the use of a specified figure, 
either a fixed dollar amount or par value, as the take-over price 
under the agreement. Such a price may be satisfactory for a short 
period of time,90 but it will eventually fall out of line with the true 
value of the corporation's stock. Although this discrepancy in 
value will not normally invalidate the agreement,91 a few courts 
86 See Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. REv. 325 at 333 (1952). 
87 See ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., 
112 (1953). 
88 See note 34 supra. 
89 See court's discussion of this question in In re Marshall, 147 Misc. 4, 262 N.Y.S. 
191 (1930). 
90 O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Plan-
ning and Drafting," 65 HARv. L. REv. 773 at 801 (1952). 
91-Compare Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 222 Pa. 58, 70 A. 956 (1908), with Sands v. 
Miner, 16 App. Div. 347, 44 N.Y.S. 894 (1897). 
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consider such agreements unconscionable92 and some state agencies 
will refuse to accept articles of incorporation containing such pro-
visions. 93 Regardless of the legality of the technique, it seems 
highly undesirable where the parties have any wish to obtain a 
"fair" price for their interests. 
By the addition of a provision for periodic redetermination of 
the price by the parties, however, the above unfairness can be 
largely obviated and the fixed-price method can become one of the 
most effective devices for setting the price under a buy-sell agree-
ment. 94 "A typical clause would provide for a yearly review of the 
price on the same day as the annual meeting of the shareholders 
and, further, that the new price, if any, should not become effec-
tive until reduced to writing and signed by all the parties .... "95 
The advantages of this method are numerous. It is easy to draft, to 
understand, and to apply. It does not involve any confusing formu-
lae and it is entirely free from specific standards and basic terms 
which might later generate disputes.96 It enables the parties to 
judge their status at a glance and to adjust their activities accord-
ingly. It does not force the parties to determine the value of the en-
terprise in any particular manner but rather permits them to ham-
mer out a valuation which seems fair in the light of all factors 
known to them, including the effect of a stockholder's withdrawal 
from the corporation. Moreover, it is an extremely flexible method 
which is able to adjust annually to the changing fortunes of the 
business. Most significantly, it operates on the self-interest of all 
the parties to the agreement and is therefore calculated to insure 
the achievement of a "fair" price, so long as their bargaining posi-
tions and chances of survival remain equal. As Forster concludes in 
his article on valuation, "as of any given time, the owners of a busi-
ness are the persons best able to determine what it is worth."97 In 
92 See, e.g., Greene v. E. H. Rollins &: Sons, Inc., 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A. (2d) 249 (1938). 
93 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 773 at 783-784 (1952). 
94 See Kubicek, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Restrictions on the 
Transferability of Stock," 43 Iu.. B. J. 766 at 775 (1955). 
95 Overbeck and Teevan, "What Every Lawyer Should Know About Buy and Sell 
Agreements," 43 ILL. B.J. 264 at 277 (1955). 
96 But see Rohrlich, "Legal Problems in the Organization and Structure of a Close 
Business Corporation," 124 N.Y. L.J. 282, col. 2 (1950), for a quaere whether a procedure 
which requires periodic agreement among the parties doesn't tend to keep alive a point 
of issue, with the danger of bringing disagreement rather than agreement to the surface. 
97 Forster, "Valuing a Business Interest for the Purposes of a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," 4 STAN. L. R.Ev. 325 at 331 (1952). 
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view of the fact that interests in close corporations are not usually 
readily saleable and do not have any clear market values, it has 
been argued that the value arrived at by arm's-length agreement 
of the parties is "probably as fair as any."98 And, as long as it oper-
ates smoothly, it is very inexpensive. 
It should be evident that the most serious shortcoming of the 
periodically-renegotiated fixed-price method as formulated thus 
far is its susceptibility to abuse by a shareholder who expects to 
be a survivor. By holding out for a low valuation or refusing to 
agree and thereby perpetuating the existing low price, he can force 
a cheap takeover.09 There is also the problem of the parties' in-
dolence or neglect which may cause an old price to continue in 
existence long after it has ceased adequately to reflect "fair" value. 
One writer has suggested that a remedy for these problems might 
lie in a "safety clause" providing that the fixed price should not 
be binding on the parties unless it had been reviewed and ap-
proved within, say, two years. And, in the event the old fixed price 
lapsed, some alternative should be prescribed, such as keeping the 
old price as a base but automatically adjusting it by the increase 
or decrease in "book value" between the date of its adoption and 
the operative date of the agreement.100 The trouble with this sug-
gestion is that it gives the prospective survivor two years in which 
to take advantage of the old value and also introduces all the prob-
lems inherent in a "book value" technique at the end of those two 
years. A preferable solution would seem to be a clause which re-
quires the use of appraisal or arbitration to fix the price whenever 
the shareholders cannot agree or whenever there has been no re-
view of the old price within thirty or sixty days of the date speci-
fied for renegotiation.101 The self-interest of the parties and in-
telligent supervision of their interests by their counsel and ac-
countants should prevent a perpetuation of an old price through 
OSLAIKIN, DEATH, TAXES AND YOUR BUSINESS 27 (1948); but see Krebs v. McDonald's 
Exr., (Ky. 1953) 266 S.W. (2d) 87 at 90, where the court commented on the fact that the 
valuations arrived at periodically under the fixed-price agreement never sensitively 
reflected the changes in actual value throughout the years. 
99 But see Chase Nat. Bank v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 406, 39 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 370 (1943), where the court undertook to set a fair price when one stockholder 
refused to agree ,because of the bad health of the other stockholder. 
100 See Block, "Book Value Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements,'' 95 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
408 (1956). 
101 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting,'' 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 at 806 (1952). 
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neglect. The draftsman might also want to specify that the 
appraiser or arbitrator take as his basis for valuation the price last 
agreed upon by the parties and modify that price only to the extent 
that the shares have changed their value since the last setting of 
that price.102 
One problem that inheres in the fixed-price method, even with 
periodic redetermination, is the failure of the agreed price to re-
flect drastic changes that may have occurred in the business be-
tween the date of the last agreed price and the operative date of the 
agreement. These changes might result from such things as divi-
dend payments or other withdrawals, extraordinary profits or 
losses, assessment of heavy taxes, and the like. One way of minimiz-
ing the risk of such occurrences is to increase the frequency of the 
required redeterminations. However, the increased accuracy of re-
flected value must be weighed against the additional inconven-
ience to the parties. It does not seem too burdensome, how-
ever, to require the redetermination to be made once every six 
months, especially if the corporation has a semi-annual audit 
which allows the parties to evaluate quickly the change in 
the corporation's financial position. It would also be pos-
sible to provide for the parties to make some adjustment in 
the price for designated extraordinary events, based perhaps 
on actual or anticipated changes in the next balance sheet. 
But this might invite controversy as to the proper adjust-
ments. Perhaps the best solution is to combine closely spaced 
periods of renegotiation with a provision for a responsible 
third party's adjustment of the last price for extraordinary events 
since it was set, his decision to be binding. Or the draftsman may 
conclude that the chances of anything drastic happening from 
one period to the next are so slight that all parties ought to take 
the risk since, at the time of drafting, the discrepancy has as much 
chance of working in favor of each party as against him. 
As was the case with a book value method, the agreement 
should specify that all factors, including good will and other 
intangibles, were taken into consideration in arriving at the initial 
price. It would probably be better to omit any requirement that a 
particular factor be considered by the parties in their later de-
terminations, since this subjects later fixed prices to possible attack 
for alleged failure to take such a factor into account. 
102Ibid. 
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It is this writer's opinion that, as a general proposition, the 
fixed-price technique, periodically renegotiated with the above 
modifications, provides the most satisfactory method for arriv-
ing at a "fair" price simply and inexpensively. 
Combination of Methods 
There are innumerable combinations of the basic methods 
which can be used effectively. Adding appraisal or arbitration to 
the fixed-price method can, as illustrated above, be helpful in 
many instances. The draftsman of a buy-sell agreement for a new 
business might consider the possibility of employing a par value or 
book value method during the formative years of the enterprise 
and switching to a formula technique after a predetermined 
number of years or the achievement of a certain amount of net 
earnings or both. Suggestions have been made for the use of dif-
ferent valuation techniques to determine the value of different 
assets, such as appraisal for land and buildings, book value for 
inventory and fixtures, mutual agreement for patents and trade-
marks, and capitalization of earnings for good will.103 Or one tech-
nique can be used to limit another technique, for example, pro-
viding that the appraisal value shall not be less than "book 
value."104 Then there is the possibility of averaging the results 
arrived at under two or more different methods.105 
Another variation that merits consideration is a provision 
which varies the price or the price-fixing method with the nature 
of the transfer.106 The agreement might provide that if the corpor-
ation or surviving shareholders become obligated to buy the stock 
of the departing stockholder because of death, disability, or 
retirement after a certain age (say sixty-five), the purchase price 
will be 100 percent of the amount determined under the valua-
tion method in the agreement; but if the transfer is for any other 
reason, such as an early voluntary withdrawal or dismissal for 
cause, the purchase price will be a lesser percentage, say 80 or 
90 percent, of that valuation. This variation may discourage a 
103 RoHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, rev. ed., II3 
(1953). 
104 See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations: 
Planning and Drafting, " 65 HARv. L. 'R.Ev. 773 at 806 (1952). 
105 Ibid. 
10a Id. at 807. 
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shareholder from voluntarily withdrawing from the corporation 
when the agreed price looks high or the business prospects look 
low.107 Moreover, it will be useful in reducing the financial im-
pact of an unexpected withdrawal which cannot be protected 
against by funding with insuranc:e as can death and, perhaps, 
disability or retirement after a fixed date. Whether this difference 
in price for some inter vivos transfers as compared with the price 
at death will have any adverse tax consequences is considered in 
the following section. 
TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
There are significant tax consequences which attach to the 
adoption and use of a restrictive agreement, and the draftsman 
must consider them very carefully in selecting, the appropriate 
form for the agreement. Tax factors may affect or control, among 
other things, whether the agreement should be a cross-purchase 
type (among the stockholders exclusively) or an entity type (with 
the corporation as the redeeming party), and whether the agree-
ment should be funded by insurance. Indeed, one writer has 
suggested that the obsession with taxes often obscures the more 
fundamental business and estate planning objectives of restric-
tive agreements.108 The need for balanced planning cannot be 
denied, but it is undoubtedly true that tax considerations weigh 
heavily in the balance. It is not within the scope of this article 
to deal with the tax consequences of restrictive agreements as 
such. A number of good articles have been written on the sub-
ject.109 However, insofar as taxes have a bearing on the choice 
of a price-fixing mechanism, they have a particular relevance 
here. Their impact is most noticeable in the area of estate and 
inheritance valuation of closely held stock; for, with proper plan-
ning, the price fixed under the restrictive agreement can be con-
clusive of value for federal estate tax purposes and, sometimes, 
for state inheritance tax purposes.110 The agreed price does not, 
101 Ibid. 
10s See Swados, "Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agree-
ment," 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 189 at 216 (1957). 
109 See, e.g., Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look," 
N.Y. UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 (1957); comment, 57 MICH. L. REv. 578 (1959); 
note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1958). 
110 See Matter of Miller's Estate, 191 Misc. 784, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 372 (1948). But see 
In re Cowles, 36 Wash. (2d) 710, 219 P. (2d) 964 (1950). See also note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 
687 at 691 (1958). 
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however, fix the valuation of the stock for federal gift tax pur-
poses.111 The advantages of having the restricted price establish 
the value of the stock for estate tax purposes are substantial. It 
permits more intelligent estate planning by providing a measure 
of the future estate tax to be assessed and it precludes a long and 
costly battle with the Internal Revenue Service over the proper 
valuation.112 More important, however"' is the protection it offers 
against the estate's being burdened with heavy taxes- based upon 
a high valuation for stock which is actually sold at a lower fig-
ure.113 The significance of this last advantage should not be over-
looked. Where the Commissioner is not bound by the price in 
the restrictive agreement, his own valuation is presumed to be cor-
rect by the courts.114 And the executor's chances of sustaining 
a figure even reasonably close to his own valuation are not 
good.115 The estate tax considerations are important even in 
corporations whose shareholders have estates small enough to 
qualify for exemption from federal estate taxes. The restrictive 
agreement is a long-term arrangement and the fortunes of the 
corporation or its constituent shareholders may be greatly changed 
when a death finally makes the agreement operative. 
There is some confusion as to exactly what effect a restrictive 
agreement can have on federal estate tax valuation of the closely 
held stock. Although the Commissioner officially contends that 
he need not be bound by a price incorporated within a restrictive 
agreement regardless of the circumstances, 116 the courts have 
limited the estate tax valuation to the restricted price, despite 
the Commissioner's objection, where certain essential elements 
were present.117 Briefly stated, those elements are (I) the agree-
ment must restrict the right of the stockholder to transfer his stock 
111 See Rev. Rul. 189, 1953-2 CuM. BUL. 294; Commissioner v. McCann, (2d Cir. 1944) 
146 F. (2d) 385. 
112See Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look," N.Y. 
UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 at 1068 (1957). 
113 See Koch, "Estate Planning and Tax Aspects of the Buy and Sell Agreement," 
5 J. All[. Soc. OF CHARTERED LIFE UNDERWRITERS 65 at 75 (1949). 
114 See Rice, "The Valuation of Close Held Stocks: A Lottery in Federal Taxation," 
98 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 367 at 378 (1950), and cases cited therein. 
115 See Pavenstedt, "The Second Circuit Reaffirms the Efficacy of Restrictive Stock 
Agreements To Control Estate Tax Valuation," 51 MICH. L. REv. 1 at 6 (1952). 
116 See Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2031-2(h), 21 FED. REc. 7867 (1956). 
117 See, e.g., Lomb v. Sudgen, (2d Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 166; May v. McGowan, (2d 
Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 396. 
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during his life as well as upon death,118 (2) the agreed price 
upon an inter vivos transfer under the agreement cannot be higher 
than upon death,119 (3) the estate must be bound to sell at 
death, either absolutely or at the option of the specified pur-
chaser,120 (4) the agreement must contain a stipulated price or a 
technique for determining the price, 121 (5) and the agreement 
must have been a good faith, arm's-length transaction entered 
into for full and adequate consideration as of the time it was 
signed.122 An option in the prospective purchaser will have the 
same binding effect on valuation as a mandatory purchase (buy-
sell agreement) if all the required elements are present.123 The 
Commissioner and the courts will examine more closely agree-
ments between related parties since the elements of full and ade-
quate consideration, good faith, and arm's-length bargaining may 
be missing.124 The omission of good will as a factor in setting the 
price may also subject the transaction to greater scrutiny.125 The 
failure to include a proportionate share of the insurance proceeds 
in the computation of the decedent's interest under an insurance-
funded entity plan may also reflect upon the adequacy of con-
sideration, good faith, and arm's-length bargaining.126 
As can be seen from the above summary, the more accurately 
the price or price-fixing method in the agreement approximates 
actual value the more likely the Commissioner is to accept that 
price as determinative for estate tax purposes. Thus, the draftsman 
has an additional reason for trying to give the parties a "fair" 
price. Presumably, a capitalization of earnings method or other 
formula which takes a number of factors into consideration would 
be the most acceptable to the Commissioner since it represents 
11s See, e.g., Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944), acq. 1944-1 CuM. BUL. 19. 
119 See Baltimore Nat. Bank v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 642 at 654. 
120 See, e.g., Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954), acq. 1955-2 CuM. BuL. 10. 
121 See, e.g., Brodrick v. Gore, (10th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 892. 
122 See Edith M. Bense!, 36 B.T.A. 246 at 253 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 
639; Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2031-2(h), 21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956). 
123 See Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A Review and a New Look," N.Y. 
UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 at 1078 (1957). 
124 See Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 Cull!. BUL. 187 at 193-194; Claire Giannini Hoffman, 
2 T.C. 1160 (1943). 
125 See Estate of George Marshall Trammell, 18 T.C. 662 (1952), acq. 1953-1 CuM. 
BUL. 6; Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 CUM. BUL. 255; Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2031-3, 
21 FED. REG. 7867 (1956). 
126 Proposed Regs. under 1954 Code, §20.2042-l(c)(6), 21 FED. REG. 7886 (1956). See 
note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 687 at 693-694 (1958); Friedman, "Buy and Sell Agreements: A 
Review and a New Look," N.Y. UNIV. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1053 at 1073-1076 (1957). 
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an obvious attempt to reach a fair arm's-length valuation.127 
However, the courts have equally sustained other methods, such 
as book value, 128 par value, 129 and fixed price130 even where the 
discrepancy between the restricted price and actual value was con-
siderable. The addition of a provision for periodic renegotiation 
of a fixed price would seem to reinforce the binding nature of 
the restricted price since it tends to reduce even more that dis-
crepancy. This is subject to a caveat, however, in the case of re-
lated parties who might use such an arrangement to set a high 
price when an inter vivos sale was contemplated and a low price 
when death was anticipated.131 
The methods that are subject to the most doubt as to their 
binding effect on the Commissioner are appraisal and arbitra-
tion. Hornstein states 'that the federal taxing authorities "are 
not bound by a price to be determined by appraisers or arbitra-
tors."132 He cites no authority for this proposition, however, and 
none has been found by this writer. Koch asserts that "the pur-
chase price must be capable of being ascertained pursuant to the 
provisions of the buy and sell agreement."133 But the case law is 
silent on this question and it does not appear to have been squarely 
presented to a court. The rationale of the concept that a restricted 
price can limit the valuation for estate tax purposes, however, 
does not seem to support this notion of ascertainability. If the 
stock can be sold only for a certain price, it has no .greater 
value to the decedent or his estate than that price. The fact that 
the price is not read1ly ascertainable from the face of the agree-
ment does not alter its restrictive quality. The time necessary to 
ascertain the price under a complex formula or book value method 
may be longer than that necessary for an appraisal by an independ-
ent third party. And a precise dollars-and-cents figure may be as 
121 See Swados, "Death and Nonsense: The Decline and Fall of the Buy-Sell Agree-
ment," 26 FORDHAM L. REV. 189 at 193 (1957). 
128 See, e.g., Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954), acq. 1955-2 CUM. BuL. 10. 
129 See, e.g., Helmholz v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 165 (1933), affd. on other grounds 
(D.C. Cir. 1934) 75 F. (2d) 245, affd. 296 U.S. 93 (1935). 
130 See, e.g., Wilson v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 682. 
131 See Edith M. Bensel, 36 B.T .A. 246 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 639; 
WARREN AND SURREY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIET TAXATION 611 (1956). See also note, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 687 at 692, n. 24 (1958). 
132 Hornstein, "Arbitration in the 'Incorporated Partnership,'" 12 ARB. J. 28 at 29 
(1957). 
133 Koch, "Estate Planning and Tax Aspects of the Buy and Sell Agreement,'' 5 J. 
AM. Soc. OF CHARTERED LIFE UNDERWRITERS 65 at 75 (1949). 
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obscure from the face of the agreement when the former methods 
are used as the latter. The real test should be whether the deced-
ent's stock was subject to sale at a price fixed under a prede-
termined method rather than being saleable without limitation on 
price. Thus where the agreement requires a sale but omits a 
price or price-fixing device, there has been no effective limitation 
on the price at which the stock must be transferred and its value 
has been affected only insofar as the range of prospective pur-
chasers has been narrowed to a designated group. Where, how-
ever, the estate is bound to sell at a price set by an independent 
third party, the value of the stock has been as effectively limited 
as if the price had been set by an independent formula. This is 
even more evident where a fixed price plus renegotiation method 
has limited the price, and the mere addition of appraisal or ar-
bitration as an alternative method in no way undermines the 
restrictive character of the price-fixing provision. Where the 
agreement specifies only that the price is to be determined by the 
parties at the time of death and, if they cannot agree, then by 
arbitration, the actual use of the arbitrator's valuation should 
bind the Commissioner. If, on the other hand, the arbitration 
is not utilized because the parties themselves have agreed, the 
Commissioner is still free to attack the price as not having been 
reached by an arm's length deal or for full and adequate 
consideration. 
Until some case law definitively answers these questions, the 
area of appraisal or arbitration is not free from doubt. The use of 
these methods, either independently or in conjunction with 
others, is a question of judgment for the draftsman who must 
weigh the risks of adverse tax consequences against the anticipated 
advantages of the methods. Some comfort may be taken in the like-
lihood that a price fixed by appraisal or arbitration will be close 
to the "true" value, although there is no assurance that the 
Commissioner will agree as to what is "true" value. 
Another price-fixing decision which may be affected by tax 
considerations is whether to provide for a cheaper take-over on 
certain transfers, like early retirement, than on others, like death. 
The fact that a formula or book value method inherently permits 
such variations does not appear to change the binding effect of 
the restrictive price upon estate tax valuation.184 But if the agree-
134 See note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 687 at 692 (1958). 
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ment uses different methods for different events, such as "book 
value" upon death but 80 percent of "book value" on voluntary 
retirement, some contention may be made that the restricted 
price is not binding on the death of the stockholder for estate 
tax purposes.135 Such a contention ought not to be sustained, 
however, since the cases seem to regard agreements as not binding 
only when an inter vivos transfer price can be higher than the 
price on death.136 The estate tax danger is that the parties will 
provide for inter vivos transfers at a fair price but reduce that 
price at death to minimize estate taxes. No such danger is present 
in the provision which merely attempts to value the stock some-
what lower when a stockholder voluntarily leaves the corporation 
than when he is forced to withdraw. The value at death, which is 
the only important consideration for estate tax purposes, is un-
affected by this inter vivos modification. Nevertheless, the drafts-
man may conclude that the absence of such a variation would 
make the agreement "cleaner" for tax purposes. This would be 
especially true where the corporate entity is the purchaser because 
the percentage feature might accentuate the non-corporate pur-
pose of the entity agreement, thereby subjecting the redemption 
payments to treatment as constructive dividends to the surviving 
stockholders.137 
135 Cf. ibid. 
136 See, e.g., Baltimore Nat. Bank v. United States, (D.C. -Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 
642 at 654. 
137 Compare Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952), and Tucker v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 
1955) 226 F. (2d) 177, with Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957). Also see Emeloid Co. 
v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 230; note, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 687 at 702-707 
(1958). 
